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With the negotiation of the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), we all believed we had 
entered a new age: an age of unheralded peace and security, 
of justice, of an end to impunity; an age of accountability.  
At the time we believed the statute to be the biggest advance 
for peace and security through the rule of law since the 
United Nations Charter of 1945. 
law, blending politics with justice. It spoke 
to all of us as individuals over or beyond 
our nationality; it spoke to us as global 
citizens, albeit through serious sanction 
and not liberation. 
Yet just 14 years into its existence, 
the International Criminal Court faces 
a crisis of confidence. Several states have 
announced an intention to withdraw, and 
a regional organisation is considering 
setting up a counterpart. What has 
happened to the institution? What has 
developed in the relationship between 
power and law? This article seeks to 
provide an answer within the context 
of a vision of ‘global law for the global 
community’.
Introduction
When the Rome Statute was completed in 
1998, bringing the ICC into existence four 
years later, it represented the culmination 
of work, spanning a century, towards 
strengthening the rule of international 
law, by introducing individual 
accountability for certain criminal actions 
of international significance. That effort 
marked a number of seminal historical 
moments of the 20th century.
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The Rome Statute promised the missing 
function to the long-promised form of 
individual criminal accountability. Not 
merely augmenting state responsibility, 
the statute left state responsibility for 
dead. Thumbing its nose at the political 
bodies of the UN system, the statute 
established an entirely independent line 
of judicial authority. It promised beacon-
like authority for taming power through 
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•	 At	the	end	of	the	First	World	War,	
the Treaty of Versailles envisaged a 
tribunal to try the German kaiser 
for ‘a supreme offence against 
international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties’. No such crime 
existed and, largely as a result, no 
agreement was reached and no trial 
undertaken.
•	 In	the	late	1940s,	however,	the	
Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals 
ensured that Axis leaders were 
individually tried, with many 
convicted, for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and crimes against 
peace. Again, no such crimes existed 
in positivist law during the war, 
although it can be argued that they 
were part of customary law, and 
the constitutional documents of the 
tribunals were based on that opinion.
•	 The	young	United	Nations	intended	
for the transition of the world from 
one-off tribunals to a permanent 
international criminal court. A draft 
statute existed by the early 1950s, 
but the onset of the Cold War halted 
progress.  
•	 With	the	Cold	War	terminating	
in the late 1980s, the subject of a 
permanent court was reinstated 
on the agenda of the UN General 
Assembly at the initiative of Trinidad 
and Tobago. With support from 
Canada and the European Union, 
negotiations for a treaty establishing 
such a court succeeded within a short 
space of time (1995–98). With the 
requisite number of 60 ratifications, 
the Rome Statute came into force, 
and the ICC into existence, on 1 July 
2002. The development signified, 
potentially, a new era in international 
relations.
Membership
The court’s membership has grown 
rapidly, with 124 states parties to the 
Rome Statute in 2016. It has coexisted 
with other, ad hoc tribunals (in the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda) and hybrid 
arrangements between the UN and 
nation states (Cambodia, Sierra Leone), 
and regional organisations (such as a 
Senegal-African Union body for the trial 
of a former leader of Chad). Unlike these 
others, the ICC is a permanent institution 
with potentially global reach.
The current membership of the court, 
while satisfying in many ways, masks 
two shortcomings: the power factor and 
a regional skew. The power factor, while 
unsurprising, is vividly portrayed in the 
case of the ICC. Whether they are states 
or individuals, it is the larger or more 
powerful that resist the strengthening of 
the law, and the weaker or smaller that 
promote it. It is no accident that most 
of the major powers (the United States, 
Russia, China, India) are not parties. 
Russia signed the statute in 2000 but 
has not ratified the agreement and in 
November 2016 notified the secretary 
general	 of	 the	 Federation’s	 intention	 to	
no longer be a party to the Rome Statute. 
China	and	India	have	not	signed.	France	
and the United Kingdom, however, have 
ratified and are thus parties. 
The United States has vacillated over 
the court, having signed the statute 
in 2000 and then voided its signature 
in	 2002.	 For	 some	 years	 it	 maintained	
bilateral agreements with many countries 
in which the latter agreed not to hand over 
US	nationals	to	the	court.	For	a	few	years	
it persuaded the UN Security Council to 
pass resolutions to similar effect, and its 
congress maintained sanctions against 
states that refused bilateral agreements. 
After some years, however, this policy 
has softened, in so far as the US sees the 
court as a potentially useful instrument, 
or at least awkward to avoid or deny in 
some circumstances, such as Sudan.  
The refusal of three of the permanent 
members of the Security Council to 
become parties to the Rome Statute stands 
in stark relief to the exercise of their 
power to have the council refer nationals, 
including heads of state, of those states 
which	are	parties	to	the	statute.	From	the	
standpoint of many states parties, this is 
the height of hypocrisy.  
A skew in regional membership of the 
court is also noticeable. Of the 124 parties, 
the majority come from Europe, Africa, 
Latin America and the Pacific. Only eight 
parties are from Asia (including Japan, 
South Korea, Philippines, Bangladesh 
and Afghanistan); major countries, such 
as India and Pakistan, North Korea and 
Indonesia, remain aloof. Only one party 
is from the Middle East (Jordan), while 
four states (Egypt, Oman, Syria and 
Yemen) have signed but not ratified. 
Iran and Israel have not ratified, despite 
having signed on the same day in 
December 2000.
The fact that major powers are the last 
to adhere to the rule of international law 
is well known. The regional skew is less 
explicable. To some extent it is correlated 
with crisis areas (such as Kashmir, the 
Middle East and North Africa). But this 
is not total: South Korea joined the court 
despite the tensions on the peninsula. 
There is, moreover, the argument that 
ratification, at least as part of a truce 
arrangement, would strengthen the rule 
of law and help prevent the recurrence of 
tension. 
Jurisdiction
The court’s jurisdiction is clearly defined 
in the statute, which lays down the 
principle of complementarity, specifies the 
origin of advancing complaints and the 
opening of investigations, and identifies 
the crimes within its jurisdiction. 
Complementarity
The ICC stands as a court of last instance, 
the presumption being that a state 
party’s domestic criminal jurisdiction 
is sufficiently robust to handle its 
own cases. But, under the principle 
Whether they are states or individuals, it 
is the larger or more powerful that resist 
the strengthening of the law, and the 
weaker or smaller that promote it.
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of complementarity, the ICC accepts 
jurisdiction if a state party is unable or 
unwilling to ensure that criminal justice 
will apply through its own domestic 
jurisdiction in a specific case. 
Exercise of jurisdiction 
Under the statute there are four 
possibilities for enabling the court to 
exercise jurisdiction:
•	 self-referral:	a	state	party	can	request	
the court to open an investigation 
over alleged crimes within its own 
territory, on the grounds that it lacks 
the capacity to do so within its own 
domestic jurisdiction;
•	 other	state	referral:	a	state	party	
may request the court to open an 
investigation over alleged crimes by 
another state (not necessarily a party) 
if its own nationals have been victims 
of the alleged crimes;
•	 UN	Security	Council	referral:	
the Security Council may refer a 
situation to the court if it judges this 
to be in the interests of international 
peace and security;
•	 proprio motu: the prosecutor is 
empowered to open an investigation, 
either on his or her own initiative or 
in response to allegations advanced 
by private groups.
The crimes 
The statute accords jurisdiction to the 
court over ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community 
as a whole’. It confines that jurisdiction to 
four crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and aggression. 
The first three crimes differ from 
the fourth: with respect to these the law 
governs crimes committed in the course 
of conflict (ius in bello). In contrast, 
aggression is a crime that commits a 
state or individuals to conflict itself 
(ius ad bellum). The court has exercised 
jurisdiction over the first three since July 
2000 but, for reasons explained below, 
aggression is not yet justiciable. 
The crime of aggression is also 
different in another important sense. 
While the other crimes might be 
committed against a leader, in most cases 
they are committed by local military 
commanders, usually of rebel forces. In 
the case of aggression, the crime belongs 
to the most senior leader: political 
leaders in the form of heads of state or 
government (including cabinet ministers, 
such as the minister of defence), or 
the military leader of a country (the 
commander of the armed forces). Partly 
because of the sensitivities, the crime of 
aggression did not become justiciable 
in July 2002 with the other three. The 
decision was taken in 1998 to include 
aggression as a leadership crime, but to 
defer justiciability until two conditions 
were met: reaching a legal definition of 
the crime, and setting out the conditions 
under which the court would exercise 
jurisdiction.1
Defining the crime of aggression has 
been a challenging exercise. As early as 
1933 the USSR took an initiative with 
the Convention for the Definition of 
Aggression. But the convulsions of the 
1930s and ’40s, and a divided world, 
blocked any constructive progress. In 
1974, however, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a seminal resolution defining 
aggression, which served as the basis for 
political, and to some extent legal, work.2 
But for the purposes of criminal law, a 
precise and exhaustive definition was 
required. In the early 2000s a working 
group on the definition of aggression 
produced a draft legal definition of 
aggression. 
In 2010 the review conference of the 
Assembly of the States Parties to the 
ICC achieved a remarkable diplomatic 
breakthrough in which both conditions, 
a definition and the conditions of 
jurisdictional competence, were agreed. 
The Kampala amendment, now ratified 
by 32 states parties, requires a final 
decision by the states parties, meeting 
as an assembly after January 2017, to 
proceed. If and when that occurs, the 
crime of aggression becomes subject to 
the court’s jurisdiction, effective one year 
after the assembly’s decision, for those 
parties ratifying the amendment. 
The introduction of aggression 
as an individual leadership crime 
in international law will have a 
revolutionary effect on international 
relations. A president or prime minister 
of a state party, a defence minister, 
or a commander of a nation’s armed 
forces will be individually liable 
under international criminal law, if 
their country’s armed forces commit 
aggression as defined in the Kampala 
amendment. This is where power 
meets law, perhaps more vividly than 
in any other example. The relationship 
between the political responsibility of 
the UN Security Council to determine 
whether aggression has been committed 
under article 39 of the UN Charter, and 
the judicial responsibility of the ICC 
to determine whether aggression has 
been committed under an amended 
Rome Statute, is highly sensitive. The 
compromise solution at Kampala accords 
the Security Council some discretion 
vis-à-vis the court. It can require 
the court to defer any investigation 
for a 12-month period, though such 
deferral is not indefinite. But the court’s 
independence on substance is largely 
retained: a decision by the prosecutor 
whether to proceed is not conditional 
on any prior political decision by the 
Security Council. 
Record of the court, 2002–16
The record of the court’s dealings to date 
is shown in Table 1. 
It is clear that the court has a full load, 
at least for its limited capacity. In short:
In the case of aggression, the crime 
belongs to the most senior leader: 
political leaders in the form of heads of 
state or government ... or the military 
leader of a country ....
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•	 Nine	trials	have	run	their	course:	
four defendants have been found 
guilty (with one appealing and three 
under consideration for victim 
reparations); one has been acquitted; 
one case has been withdrawn; one 
has been vacated; and two charges 
were not confirmed.
•	 Five	trials	are	currently	under	way.
•	 Ten	cases	are	under	investigation	
(including the only one involving 
alleged genocide). 
•	 Ten	more	cases	are	under	preliminary	
examination. 
African tensions
The ICC has come under increasing 
criticism from some African states. A 
number of states parties have recently 
commenced the process of withdrawal:
•	 on	12	October	2016	the	Burundi	
Parliament decided to withdraw, 
notifying the UN secretary general 
on the 26th;
•	 on	19	October	South	Africa	
submitted its instrument of 
withdrawal, which takes effect one 
year later; 
•	 on	25	October	Gambia	announced	
an intention to withdraw;
•	 Namibia	has	stated	an	intention	to	
withdraw, its cabinet having made 
such a decision. 
African criticism of the court
The African criticism focuses on alleged 
bias in selection of investigations and 
prosecutions, a sensitivity heightened 
when sitting heads of state or government 
are involved. The president of Sudan 
has been issued with an arrest warrant, 
and the president and prime minister of 
Kenya have been under investigation. The 
opposition to the court has taken the form 
of non-cooperation over the Sudan case 
and a recent movement to withdraw from 
the court, spearheaded by Kenya. 
In the case of Sudan, the investigation 
derived from a referral by the UN 
Security Council in 2005.3 An arrest 
warrant was issued within months 
against the president and other officials. 
The council’s resolution, adopted under 
chapter VII of the UN charter, called on 
all UN member states to fully cooperate 
with the ICC. Despite this, the African 
Union responded with a resolution 
calling on states parties not to cooperate. 
The president has visited many African 
countries, including states parties, 
without being arrested. Under the UN 
Charter (article 103), decisions made 
by the United Nations take precedence 
over those by regional organisations. 
The African Union decisions are, in fact, 
invalid and in violation of the charter and 
the binding Security Council resolution.  
The case of Kenya involved an 
investigation of two political leaders for 
alleged crimes committed in the wake of 
the 2007 election. The prosecutor opened 
the investigation with the support of 
the then president and prime minister. 
The two leaders under investigation 
were installed subsequently as president 
and prime minister, with resulting 
opposition to the investigation from the 
new government and serious witness 
intimidation. The cases against the 
leaders were dropped, although charges 
against other individuals are retained. 
Reflections on the criticism
Much of the criticism derives from 
concerns over who has the power 
to advance allegations and initiate 
investigation. Table 2 shows the source 
of the cases under investigation or 
preliminary examination. 
As is shown, only two cases have been 
referred by the Security Council. Eight 
cases have been self-referred, and nine 
have been opened by the prosecutor, 
of which five are in Africa and four 
elsewhere. The evidence suggests that 
there is, in fact, no bias against Africa. 
Table 1: Summary of ICC cases, by stage*
Stage Genocide War Crimes Crimes Against 
Humanity 
Total
Preliminary 0 4 4 10
Under investigation 1 7 9 10
Pre-trial 0 0 0 0
Trial 0 3 3 5
Appeals 0 1 1 1
Reparations 0 3 1 3
Closed 0 3 4 5
Total 1 21 22 34
*  Note: The totals are not necessarily equivalent to the sum of the subsets, since more than one crime may be involved in a case, 
and because at the preliminary investigation the crime may not be publicly announced. 
Table 2: Source of authority for ICC investigations 
Self-referral Other state referral UN Security
Council referral
Proprio motu
Situations under investigation
Uganda Sudan Coˆte d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic 
of the  Congo
Libya Kenya
Mali Georgia
Central African 
Republic I
Central African 
Republic II
Preliminary examinations
Gabon Comoros (Israel) Afghanistan 
Palestine Burundi
Ukraine Colombia
Guinea
UK (Iraq)
Nigeria
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If the self-referrals are removed, the 
geographic spread appears different. 
And of the nine cases initiated by the 
prosecutor, five are from Africa, two are 
from Europe, one from Asia and one 
from Latin America. 
The political fact remains, however, 
that there is a heavy concentration on 
Africa in the court’s dealings:
•	 all	five	trials	currently	under	way	
involve African conflicts; 
•	 of	the	ten	cases	under	investigation,	
eight are African, one is Arab and 
one is European;
•	 of	the	ten	cases	under	preliminary	
examination, four are African, three 
are European (of which one involves 
a permanent Security Council 
member, the UK), two involve 
the Middle East (Palestine, and a 
complaint against Israel) and one is 
Asian. 
The withdrawing countries oppose 
in particular the arraignment of 
sitting heads of state. States parties not 
cooperating in the arrest of the Sudan 
president justify this on the grounds that 
he enjoys immunity through office. This 
is, however, not a valid understanding 
of contemporary law. It is inconsistent 
with the Nuremburg Charter of 1945, 
which states that: ‘The official position 
of defendants, whether as Heads of State 
or responsible officials in Government 
Departments, shall not be considered 
as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment.’4 In the first 
session of the UN General Assembly in 
1946, all UN member states became party 
to the London agreement containing 
the Nuremburg Charter. In the same 
resolution the assembly declared the 
London agreement and the jurisprudence 
of the Nuremburg trial to be reflective 
of customary international law. In 1950 
the General Assembly adopted a set of 
principles of international law which 
asserted that ‘the fact that a person who 
committed an act which constituted a 
crime under international law acted as 
Head of State or responsible Government 
official does not relieve him from 
responsibility under international law’.5 
The same principle was incorporated 
more recently in the draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind.6 
African defence of the court
Notwithstanding these criticisms, there is 
a robust defence of the court, including 
from African states. At the African Union’s 
27th summit in July 2016, influential 
countries (Senegal, Nigeria, Coˆte d’Ivoire, 
Tunisia and Botswana) opposed a 
proposal for ‘mass withdrawal’. 
Relevance of other conflicts
The ‘African crisis’ raises the question of 
whether the court has failed to explore 
potential crimes sufficiently in other 
regions. Where there is intense and 
continuing conflict, there will usually be 
war crimes committed. In Asia, Sri Lanka 
is not a party to the statute, but if a party’s 
nationals have been victims, the way is 
open for a complaint. The Philippines 
is a party, and the question has to be 
asked why there has been no exploration 
by the court, whether of war crimes in 
the south of the country or of crimes 
against humanity under the current ‘war 
on drugs’ policy of the new government. 
In the Pacific there may be reason for 
complaints of crimes against humanity by 
Australia	 (on	Manus	 Island)	 and	 by	 Fiji	
(repression of political leaders, citizens 
and the media).
Other countries where potential 
crimes could be alleged but which are not 
parties to the statute include Sri Lanka, 
the United States, Russia, China, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. 
Challenges facing the court
Apart from the African crisis, two 
challenges confront the court: one 
logistical, one political. The logistical 
problem concerns the limited enforcement 
power of the court. The political challenge 
is the trade-off between ‘peace’ and 
‘justice’ in any post-conflict situation. 
Enforcement 
Perhaps the biggest weakness of the Rome 
Statute is the lack of enforcement power. 
The statute does not allow trial in absentia, 
and so a suspect must be physically present 
for any trial to proceed. The prosecutor’s 
office has no intelligence capacity, nor any 
physical capacity to apprehend, arrest and 
transfer. This leads to lengthy delays in 
bringing those charged before the court 
and can diminish the court’s standing. At 
present, 11 suspects remain at large. Some 
way must be found of rectifying this. 
The trade-off between peace and justice 
This raises the difficult relationship 
between peace and justice. While it is a 
natural instinct for all involved, not least 
but not only the victims of atrocity crimes, 
to see justice dispensed, the process can 
have a chilling effect on the cementing of a 
peace arrangement. Suspects still clinging 
to power or to marginalised territory, or 
under malign protection, will only agree 
to a peace arrangement if it accords them a 
passage to impunity. The most prominent 
example of this dilemma is the case of 
former Liberian leader Charles Taylor. 
The apprehending of Taylor for alleged 
crimes during the conflict in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone was delayed for a period lest 
it impede the peace and reconciliation 
process. Ultimately, however, Taylor 
was arrested, and tried, convicted and 
sentenced in the special court for Sierra 
Leone. 
Conclusions: the future
The International Criminal Court is a 
symbol not of the global community 
but of one that is emergent. Its rationale 
and its principles are predicated on the 
peace and the human rights provisions 
So long as military power remains caged 
in national jurisdictional capability, the 
strengthening of the rule of law will 
prove difficult.
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of the United Nations Charter, a ‘statist’ 
constitutional document coined in the 
mid-20th century. Yet by bringing the 
individual within the reach of criminal 
law, it extends those provisions, bringing 
accountability from the level of the state 
to that of the individual. As described 
in the preamble to the statute, the states 
parties are conscious that ‘all peoples are 
united by common bonds, their cultures 
pieced together in a shared heritage’. And 
the parties harbour a concern that ‘this 
delicate mosaic’ might be shattered at 
any time; hence the need for a permanent 
court, one that makes no distinction 
among the 7.3 billion humans on the 
planet today, including those holding the 
highest positions of power.  
 It has not been, is not and will not be 
an easy path. So long as military power 
remains caged in national jurisdictional 
capability, the strengthening of the rule 
of law will prove difficult. Those who 
preside over the committal of the gravest 
crimes will disclaim personal liability 
through general political oversight, 
shrug off the notion of individual legal 
accountability, and take refuge in their 
military capacity to remain unreachable. 
It took years for Radovan Karadžić to 
be apprehended. Oman Al Bashir may 
never be brought before the court, 
at least during his leadership tenure. 
Leaders of the US and China will remain 
unreachable for decades. 
Until some form of enforcement 
capacity is bestowed on the court, or 
created in support of the court, through, 
perhaps, a separate enforcement agency 
(Interpol is a voluntary organisation), this 
will not change. Such a development will 
not occur in the immediately foreseeable 
future, but the same rationality and 
foresight that produced the court in the 
first place will, at some stage, result in an 
enforcement capacity that equates with 
the court’s jurisdictional competence, a 
freedom and protection from political 
bias or interference, and an objective 
application of due process and dispensing 
of justice that results in the existence of 
global law which attracts the genuine 
support of the world’s citizenry. 
We must never forget that the record 
on which we judge these defendants 
today is the record on which history 
will judge us tomorrow.
 —Judge Robert Jackson, 
Nuremburg Tribunal hearing, 1948
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